Designing Stable Elections: A Survey by Heilman, Steven
DESIGNING STABLE ELECTIONS
STEVEN HEILMAN
Abstract. We survey the design of elections that are resilient to attempted interference
by third parties. For example, suppose votes have been cast in an election between two
candidates, and then each vote is randomly changed with a small probability, independently
of the other votes. It is desirable to keep the outcome of the election the same, regardless
of the changes to the votes. It is well known that the US electoral college system is about 5
times more likely to have a changed outcome due to vote corruption, when compared to a
majority vote. In fact, Mossel, O’Donnell and Oleszkiewicz proved in 2005 that the majority
voting method is most stable to this random vote corruption, among voting methods where
each person has a small influence on the election. We discuss some recent progress on the
analogous result for elections between more than two candidates. In this case, plurality
should be most stable to corruption in votes. We also survey results on adversarial election
manipulation (where an adversary can select particular votes to change, perhaps in a non-
random way), and we briefly discuss ranked choice voting methods (where a vote is a ranked
list of candidates).
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1. Introduction
1.1. Condorcet’s Paradox. Applications of mathematics to the analysis of elections per-
haps began with Marquis de Condorcet in the 1700s. Condorcet’s famous paradox demon-
strates that an election method that uses ranked preferences of voters might not have a
sensible winner. Consider the following ranking of three candidates a, b and c between three
voters 1, 2 and 3.
Voter Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3
1 a b c
2 b c a
3 c a b
Table 1. Three voters (one for each row of the able) provide rankings of three
candidates a, b and c. For example, voter 1 most prefers candidate a.
If we ignore candidate b, then voters 2 and 3 prefer c over a, while voter 1 prefers a over
c. So, using a majority rule for these preferences, the voters prefer c over a.
Voter Rank 1 Rank 2
1 a c
2 c a
3 c a
Table 2. If candidate b is ignored in Table 1, the remaining rankings of
candidates a and c indicate that c is the preferred by the majority of voters.
If we ignore candidate c in Table 1, then voters 1 and 3 prefer a over b, while voter 2
prefers b over a. So, using a majority rule again, the voters prefer a over b.
Finally, if we ignore candidate a in Table 1, then voters 1 and 2 prefer b over c, while voter
3 prefers c over b. So, using a majority rule, the voters prefer b over c.
a
c b
a is preferred
over b
b is preferred
over c
c is pre-
ferred
over a
In conclusion, the voters prefer a over b, they prefer b over c, and they prefer c over a.
So, no one has won the election! This observation is known as Condorcet’s paradox. The
simplest way to use rankings of candidates might lead to no one winning the election.
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In fact, if we compare pairs of candidates using something other than a majority rule, then
some analogue of Condorcet’s paradox must still occur, unless we ignore all voters except for
one (a dictatorship). This statement can be formalized as Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
(see e.g. [Mos12, Kal02]).
Permanent members
Non-permanent members
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes No No Yes No
Pre-1965 rules. In this case,
the resolution passes.
1.2. Voting Power. Game Theorists such
as Shapley, Shubik and Banzhaf in the 1950s
and 1960s [SS54, Ban65] further developed
the mathematical and economical analysis of
voting methods. As an illustrative example,
we consider the 1965 restructuring of the UN
security council.
Voting Method 1 (Pre-1965 UN Security
Council). In pre-1965 rules, the UN security
council had five permanent members, and
six nonpermanent members. A resolution
passes in the security council only if:
• All five permanent members want it
to pass, and
• at least two nonpermanent members
want it to pass.
Permanent members
Non-permanent members
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes No No Yes No No No Yes Yes
Post-1965 rules. In this case,
the resolution passes.
In particular, a single permanent mem-
ber can effectively veto a resolution by vot-
ing “no” on that resolution. This voting
method was called unfair for the nonper-
manent members, so it was restructured in
1965. After the restructuring, the council
had the following form (still in use today).
Voting Method 2 (Post-1965 UN Security
Council). The UN security council has five
permanent members, and now ten nonper-
manent members. A resolution passes in the
council only if:
• All five permanent members want it
to pass, and
• at least four nonpermanent members
want it to pass.
A rather vague question is then:
Question 1.1. Are the Post-1965 rules more equitable for nonpermanent members of the
UN security council than Pre-1965 rules?
There are various ways to answer this question. One answer, provided by Banzhaf, is to
consider the power of a voter in each voting method, i.e. the relative ability of a voter to
cause a resolution to pass by changing their vote. Suppose we label the post-1965 UN security
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council members by the integers 1 through 15, where the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 represent the five
permanent members of the council, and the numbers 6, 7, . . . , 15 represent nonpermament
members. Then, for any integer i between 1 and 15, let bi be the number of combinations of
votes of members of the council (other than voter i), such that when voter i changes their
vote from “no” to “yes,” the resolution changes from not passing to passing. The Banzhaf
power index of a voter i is defined to be the following ratio
bi
b1 + b2 + · · ·+ b15 .
For example, in the post-1965 rules, what would it take for a nonpermanent member to
cause the resolution to pass? First, all permanent members would have to vote “yes.” Then,
exactly three other nonpermanent members out of nine would vote yes. So, the number
of combinations of votes other members would make is: the number of ways to select 3
members from a set of 9. This number is called 9 choose 3, i.e.
(
9
3
)
= 9·8·7
3·2 = 84. So,
b6 = b7 = · · · = b15 = 84.
In the post-1965 rules, what would it take for a permanent member to cause the resolution
to pass? First, all other permanent members would have to vote “yes.” Then, at least four
nonpermanent members out of 10 would vote yes. So, the number of combinations of votes
other members would make is: the number of ways to select at least 4 members from a set
of 10. This number is
(
10
4
)
+
(
10
5
)
+ · · ·+ (10
10
)
= 848. So, b1 = b2 = · · · = b5 = 848.
Similar considerations apply for pre-1965 rules. We summarize the Banzhaf power indices
in the following table.
Voting Method Banzhaf Power Index for
Non-Permament Member
Banzhaf Power Index for
Permament Member
Pre-1965 Rules 5
6·5+5·57 ≈ .0159 576·5+5·57 ≈ .181
Post-1965 Rules 84
10·84+5·848 ≈ .0165 84810·84+5·848 ≈ .167
Table 3. Banzhaf Power Indices for UN Security Council Voting Methods
In summary, the post-1965 rules give more power to non-permanent members, and less
power to permanent members of the UN Security Council. So, according to Banzhaf’s
definition of voting power, the answer to Question 1.1 is: yes.
−1 1 −1 1 −1−1 1 1 1 −1
f(x1, . . . , x10) = 1
Votes:
Election Winner:
f
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
1.3. Voting Methods as Functions.
Suppose we run an election between two can-
didates with n voters, where n is a large in-
teger. For convenience, we denote the two
candidates as +1 and −1 rather than a and
b. If person i votes for candidate 1, we define
xi = 1, and if person i votes for candidate
−1, we define xi = −1. We then can then
make a list of votes as
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn).
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A voting method is a function f whose input is the votes x and whose output is the winner
of election. That is, f(x) = 1 denotes candidate 1 winning the election when the votes are
x, and f(x) = −1 denotes candidate −1 winning the election when the votes are x.
−1 1 −1 1 −1−1 1 1 1 1
f(x1, . . . , x10) = sign(6− 4)
Votes:
Election Winner:
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
−1 1 −1 1 −1−1 1 1 1 1
f(x1, . . . , x10) = −1
Votes:
Election Winner:
f(x1, . . . , x10) = x1
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
Majority function
Dictator function
= sign(2) = 1
Some examples of voting methods appear
below.
Example 1.2. The majority function is
the function
f(x) = sign(x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn).
If there are more +1 votes than −1 votes,
then f(x) = 1. And if there are more −1
votes than +1 votes, then f(x) = 1. That
is, f agrees with our usual notion of major-
ity: the candidate receiving the most votes
wins the election. (Here the sign of a posi-
tive number is +1 and the sign of a negative
number is −1. We also define the sign of 0
to be 0. To guarantee that someone wins the
election, we could just assume that n is odd,
so that f never takes the value 0.)
Example 1.3. A dictator function is a
function of the form
f(x) = x1.
That is, the vote of the first person is the
winner of the election. In this way, f agrees
with our usual notion of dictator: all votes
are ignored, except for one. More generally, if 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a dictator is a function of the form
f(x) = xi.
Example 1.4. If w1, . . . , wn are fixed real numbers, a weighted majority function on n
voters is a function of the form
f(x) = sign(w1x1 + w2x2 + · · ·+ wnxn).
If w1 is large, this corresponds to assigning more “weight” (i.e. more voting power, or more
“say”) to the first voter. And if w1 is small, this corresponds to assigning less “weight” (i.e.
less voting power, or less “say”) to the first voter.
Example 1.5. A two-layer iterated majority function is a function of the form
f(x) = g(f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fm(x)),
where f1, f2, . . . , fm are each weighted majority functions on n voters, and g is a weighted
majority function m voters.
A two-layer iterated majority function is similar to an electoral college system with m
states. The US electoral college system then corresponds to m = 51.
5
−1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1
g(f1(x), f2(x), f3(x)) = 1 or − 1
Votes:
Election Winner:
f1
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
−1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1
f2
x11 x12 x13 x14 x15 x16 x17 x18 x19 x20
−1 1 −1 1 −1 −1 1 1 1 −1
f2
x21 x22 x23 x24 x25 x26 x27 x28 x29 x30
f1(x1, . . . , x10) f2(x11, . . . , x20) f3(x21, . . . , x30)
Figure 1. An iterated majority function with m = 3 “states.”
Remark 1.6. In learning theory, the iterated majority function is sometimes called a two-
layer neural network with boolean activation function. The lines and nodes in Figure 1 are
then interpreted as axons and neurons, respectively.
In the ensuing discussion, it is more convenient to replace the Banzhaf power index of a
voter with the (almost identical) notion of influence of a voter.
Definition 1.7 (Influences). Let f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} be a voting method. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ n
be an integer. Define the influence of the ith voter on f , denote Infi(f), as
Infi(f) =
# of combinations of votes where the ith voter can change the election’s outcome
# of combinations of votes of all voters
=
#{(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {−1, 1}n : f(x1, . . . , xn) 6= f(x1, . . . , xi−1,−xi, xi+1, . . . , xn)}
#{(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {−1, 1}n} .
That is, Infi(f) is the probability that the i
th voter can change the outcome of the election,
when other voters are equally likely to vote for either candidate.
Example 1.8. The numbers b1, . . . , bn used to define the Banzhaf power indices are just
the influences, multiplied by 2n. For example, in the post-1965 UN Security council voting
method f : {−1, 1}15 → {−1, 1} with n = 15 voters,
Inf1(f) = · · · = Inf5(f) = 848
215
≈ .0259, Inf6(f) = · · · = Inf15(f) = 84
215
≈ .00256.
Put another way, the Banzhaf power indices are the influences, multiplied by a number
causing them to sum to 1.
Voting Method Influence for Non-
Permament Member
Influence for Perma-
ment Member
Pre-1965 Rules 5
211
≈ .00244 57
211
≈ .0278
Post-1965 Rules 84
215
≈ .00256 848
215
≈ .0259
Table 4. Influences for UN Security Council Voting Methods
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As above, we observe that a non-permanent member has a higher probability of affecting
the outcome of a resolution in post-1965 rules.
Example 1.9. When f is a dictator function of the form f(x) = x1, then the first voter can
always change the outcome of the election, and the other voters cannot, so
I1(f) = 1, I2(f) = · · · = In(f) = 0.
When f is a majority function f(x) = sign(x1 + · · · + xn), then an application of Stirling’s
formula implies that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, limn→∞
√
nIi(f) =
√
2
pi
, i.e.
I1(f) = I2(f) = · · · = In(f) = (1 + o(1))
√
2
pi
1√
n
.
To see this, note that if n is even, recall that Stirling’s Formula implies that(
n
n/2
)
=
n!
[(n/2)]!
= (1 + o(1))
1√
2pi
√
n
n/2
2n = (1 + o(1))2n
1√
n
√
2
pi
.
Therefore, limn→∞
√
nIi(f) = limn→∞(1 + o(1)) 1√2pi
2n
2n
= 1√
2pi
, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Perhaps it is a compelling reason to vote in a majority election with one hundred million
voters when your probability of changing the election’s outcome is around 1 in ten thousand.
2. Adversarial Corruption in Voting
−1 1 −1 1 −1−1 1 1 1 −1
f(y1, . . . , y10) = −1
Original
Votes:
Election Winner:
f
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1Corrupted
Votes: y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10
2.1. Two Candidates. Suppose n peo-
ple cast their votes in an election between
two candidates. Then, suppose an adver-
sary found a way to change several of the
votes. By changing some votes, the adver-
sary attempts to change the outcome of
the election. Suppose also that the vot-
ing method f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} is bal-
anced in the following sense.
Definition 2.1 (Balanced Voting
Method). Let f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} be
a voting method. We say f is balanced if
each of the two candidates has an equal chance of winning the election. That is, the number
of combinations of votes where candidate 1 wins is equal to the number of combinations of
votes where candidate −1 wins.
For example, dictator functions and the majority function are balanced.
Question 2.2. What balanced voting method is most resilient to adversarial changes to
votes?
That is, if k ≥ 1 votes can be changed by the adversary, what is the least number of com-
binations of votes (of all voters) such that the adversary can change the election’s outcome?
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In a dictatorship, e.g. f(x1, . . . , xn) = x1, changing the first vote changes the outcome of
the election, so this voting method is not at all resilient to adversarial changes. Similarly,
a voting method that is only a function of a small set of voters (sometimes called a junta)
will probably not be resilient to adversarial changes to votes. It turns out that the majority
function is the balanced voting method most resilient to adversarial changes; we thank Daniel
Kane for telling us the following argument.
Proposition 2.3 (Adversarial Optimality of Majority). Let n be an odd positive integer
and let k be an integer satisfying 1 ≤ k ≤ n. After the votes have been cast, suppose an ad-
versary can change k votes in an election between two candidates with n voters. Then among
all balanced voting methods, the majority function has the least number of combinations of
votes where the election’s outcome can be altered by the adversary.
Before beginning the proof, we introduce some notation. For any x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn,
denote the `0 “norm” of x by ‖x‖0 = #{1 ≤ i ≤ n : xi 6= 0}. (This quantity is not a norm
since ‖tx‖0 = ‖x‖0 for any t 6= 0.) Let S ⊆ {−1, 1}n. For any integer k ≥ 1, we denote the
distance k neighborhood of S by
Γk(S) = {x ∈ {−1, 1}n : ∃ y ∈ S such that ‖x− y‖0 ≤ k}. (1)
For any k ≥ 0, let Bk ⊆ {−1, 1}n be a distance k-neighborhood of one “half” of the hyper-
cube:
Bk = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {−1, 1}n : x1 + · · ·+ xn ≤ k}. (2)
Proof of Proposition 2.3. We induct on k. Let f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} be the majority func-
tion, and let g : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} be another balanced voting method. Let S = {x ∈
{−1, 1}n : g(x) = 1} be the set of votes where candidate 1 wins the election, when g is the
voting method used to run the election. Note that B0 = {x ∈ {−1, 1}n : f(x) = 1}. Since f
and g are balanced, |S| = |B0| = 2n−1. So, Harper’s Inequality, Theorem 2.4, implies that
|Γ1(S)| ≥ |Γ1(B0)| . (3)
|Γ1(S)| − |S| ≥ |Γ1(B0)| − |B0| . (4)
The same inequality holds also when S = {x ∈ {−1, 1}n : g(x) = −1}. Taken together, we
conclude that the number of combinations of votes for which the outcome of the election
can be altered with one adversarial vote change is smallest for the majority vote f (since f
corresponds to the right side of (4)). The case k = 1 therefore follows by (4).
We now proceed with the inductive step. By the inductive hypothesis, if S = {x ∈
{−1, 1}n : g(x) = 1} or if S = {x ∈ {−1, 1}n : g(x) = −1}, we have
|Γk(S)| − |S| ≥ |Γk(B0)| − |B0| .
That is, |Γk(S)| ≥ |Γk(B0)| = |Bk|. We need to prove the case k + 1. This again follows by
Harper’s Inequality, Theorem 2.4, since
|Γk+1(S)| (1)= |Γ1(Γk(S))| ≥ |Γ1(Bk)| (2)= |Bk+1| ,
Therefore, when S = {x ∈ {−1, 1}n : g(x) = 1} or S = {x ∈ {−1, 1}n : g(x) = −1},
|Γk+1(S)| − |S| ≥ |Bk+1| − |B0| . (5)
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That is, the number of votes for which the outcome of the election can be altered with
k + 1 adversarial vote changes is smallest for the voting method f (since the majority vote
f corresponds to the right side of (5)). The inductive step and the proof are complete. 
S
The blue region
and red region
together
form Γ1(S)
The key geometric fact used above is:
Theorem 2.4 (Harper’s Inequality/
Hypercube Vertex Isoperimetric In-
equality, [Har66]). Let S ⊆ {−1, 1}n.
Let k ≥ 0. Assume that
|S| ≥ |Bk| .
Then
|Γ1(S)| ≥ |Γ1(Bk)| .
For some related observations for
ranked choice voting, see e.g. [MPR13,
Lemma 3.3].
Proposition 2.3 can easily be extended
to unbalanced voting methods. To state
such a result, let t be a real number and
define a majority function with threshold t to be a function of the form
Majn,t(x) = sign(x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn − t), ∀x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {−1, 1}n.
Also, we say that two voting methods f, g : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} have the same balance if
the number of combinations of votes resulting in candidate 1 winning are the same for each
voting method, i.e.
#{(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {−1, 1}n : f(x) = 1} = #{(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {−1, 1}n : g(x) = 1}.
For example, the majority function with threshold t = 0 and the majority function with
threshold t = 1 do not have the same balance.
Proposition 2.5 (Adversarial Optimality of Majority, Unbalanced Case). Let n be
an odd positive integer and let k be an integer satisfying 1 ≤ k ≤ n. After the votes have
been cast, suppose an adversary can change k votes in an election between two candidates
with n voters. Let f be a majority function with threshold t, where t is an even integer. Let
g be another voting method such that f and g have the same balance. Then the number of
combinations of votes where the election’s outcome can be altered by the adversary is lesser
for f than for g.
2.2. More than Two Candidates. It would be desirable to have an analogue of Propo-
sition 2.3 for voting methods with more than two candidates. Such a result might require
a version of Harper’s Inequality, Theorem 2.4, for multiple sets. It is unclear if such an
inequality can be proven
2.3. Additional Comments. Proposition 2.3 can strengthened slightly, so that a voting
method that is “close” to being as resilient as majority must itself be “close” to majority.
Instead of applying Theorem 2.4, one instead uses a stronger version, such as [KL20, KL19].
The majority function is known to be optimal in various senses. For example, the majority
function maximizes the number of votes that agree with the outcome of the election [O’D14,
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Theorem 2.33]. Apparently Rousseau argued this was an ideal choice for a voting method
in 1762 in “Du contrat social.” Theorem 3.6 below, the Majority is Stablest Theorem, also
characterizes the majority function as being the most stable to random corruption in votes,
among a reasonable class of voting methods.
For more background on social choice theory, see e.g. [O’D14, Chapter 2], [O’D], [Kal18,
Section 3].
3. Independent Random Corruption of Votes
−1 1 −1 1 −1−1 1 1 1 −1
f(y1, . . . , y10) = −1
Original
Votes:
Election Winner:
f
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
1 1 −1 1 −1 1 1 1 1 −1Corrupted
Votes: y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10
In Proposition 2.3, we showed that the
majority function is the most stable voting
method to corruption. The majority func-
tion is also most stable when votes are cor-
rupted randomly, as we describe below.
Theorem 3.1 (Majority is Stablest, In-
formal Version, [MOO10, Theorem 4.4]).
Suppose we run an election with a large
number n of voters and two candidates. In
this election, voters are modelled to have the
following random behavior:
(i) Voters cast their votes randomly, independently, with equal probability of voting for
either candidate.
(ii) Each voter has a small influence on the outcome of the election. (That is, all influ-
ences from Definition 1.7 are small.)
Then the majority function is the balanced voting method that best preserves the outcome of
the election, when votes have been corrupted independently.
The definition of “best” here is intentionally vague. We will define “best” to mean: max-
imizing noise stability, as defined in Definition 3.4. Also, the probability of each vote being
changed (corrupted) should be less than 1/2 in Theorem 3.1. Otherwise the majority pref-
erences of the electorate are reversed upon corruption.
Some remarks concerning the sensibility of the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 now follow.
• Suppose we completely ignore the votes, and just declare that the first candidate
wins. This voting method is as stable to vote corruption as one can imagine, since
any amount of corruption in votes cannot change the outcome of the election. Since
this voting method is certainly undemocratic and uninteresting, some assumption in
Theorem 3.1 must eliminate it. And indeed, the last part of (i) does eliminate this
voting method. This voting method corresponds to a constant function f .
• As we saw in Example 1.9, a dictator function has one large influence, and the
remaining voters have no influence on the election’s outcome. Consequently, the
dictator voting method is quite stable to independently random changes to votes,
since changing the votes of the non-dictators has no effect on the election’s outcome.
So, as in the previous example, the dictator function is rather stable to vote corruption
for a rather uninteresting reason. We therefore eliminate dictator functions from
consideration by imposing the democratic assumption (ii) that each voter has a
small influence on the outcome of the election.
10
3.1. Two Candidates. In this section, we will formalize the assumptions in Theorem 3.1,
resulting in the formal version of the Majority is Stablest Theorem 3.6.
Assumption 1 (Voter Assumptions).
• There are n voters denoted {1, . . . , n}. There are two candidates denoted −1 and 1.
• For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the ith voter casts a single random vote Xi taking the value −1
or 1. (In particular, we are not dealing with ranked voting methods)
• The votes (X1, . . . , Xn) are independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) random vari-
ables. That is, voters are modelled as independent decision makers with the same
probabilities of voting for either candidate.
The voting method f is a function f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}. If the votes are (X1, . . . , Xn),
then the winner of the election is f(X1, . . . , Xn).
Remark 3.2. The voter assumptions are not realistic, since e.g. a small group of friends will
most likely share similar views, read similar news items, etc., so that their decisions are not
truly independent. On the other hand, modeling a large number of voters to be independent
individuals is somewhat plausible, from an aggregate perspective.
Assumption 2 (Voter Corruption Assumptions). Let 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Suppose we are
given the votes X1, . . . , Xn of n voters choosing between k candidates. The corrupted votes
Y1, . . . , Yn are defined as follows.
• The corrupted votes Y1, . . . , Yn are independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) ran-
dom variables.
• For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if Xi = xi ∈ {−1, 1}, then with probability 1−ρ, Yi is a uniformly
random element of {1, . . . , k}, and with probability ρ, Yi = xi.
Remark 3.3. When ρ = 1, Yi = Xi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i.e. no vote corruption has occurred.
When ρ is close to 1, Y1 is almost the same as X1, i.e. X1 and Y1 are strongly correlated,
and a small amount of vote corruption has occurred.
When ρ = 0, the votes (X1, . . . , Xn) and (Y1, . . . , Yn) are independent of each other, i.e.
the corrupted votes (Y1, . . . , Yn) have been so scrambled that they have no dependence (or
correlation) with the original votes (X1, . . . , Xn).
Notation. We denote the original (random) votes cast in the election as X = (X1, . . . , Xn),
and we denote the corrupted votes as Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn).
Recall that the voting method f takes the value 1 or −1, according to which candidate (1
or −1) won the election. So, if the winner of the election f(X) is the same as the winner of
the election with corrupted votes f(Y ), then
f(X)f(Y ) = 1.
On the other hand, if the winner of the election f(X) is different than the winner of the
election with corrupted votes f(Y ), then
f(X)f(Y ) = −1.
So, the voting method that has the largest average value of
f(X)f(Y )
will be the most stable on average to random vote corruption. This observation motivates
the following definition.
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Definition 3.4 (Noise Stability). Let f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} be a voting method. The
noise stability of f with correlation parameter 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 is
Sρ(f) = Ef(X)f(Y ).
Here E denotes expected value, or average value, with respect to the random variables
X = (X1, . . . , Xn), Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) defined in Assumptions 1 and 2.
Remark 3.5. The probability that the election’s outcome stays the same after vote corrup-
tion has occurred is 1
2
(1 + Sρ(f)).
Figure 2. The proof of The-
orem 3.6 is related to the
fact that soap bubbles take a
spherical shape. A soap bub-
ble1encloses a fixed volume of
air, and it minimizes its surface
area. The majority function has
an analogous optimality prop-
erty. We will discuss this con-
nection more in Section 5.
3.1.1. Unbiased Case. Theorem 3.1 can be
restated as: the majority function maxi-
mizes noise stability, among a reasonable
class of voting methods.
In the Theorem below, we denote the
Majority function as Majn : {−1, 1}n →
{−1, 1}, so that
Majn(x1, . . . , xn) = sign(x1 + · · ·+ xn),
for all (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {−1, 1}n.
For simplicity, we first state the bal-
anced case of the Theorem. That is, we
make the assumption that the random votes
X1, . . . , Xn are each uniformly distributed in
{−1, 1}. So, e.g. X1 = 1 with 1/2 probabil-
ity, and X1 = −1 with 1/2 probability.
Theorem 3.6 (Majority is Stablest,
Formal Version, [MOO10, Conjecture
1.1]). Let 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and let ε > 0.
Then there exists τ > 0 such that, if
f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} satisfies Ef(X) = 0
and Infi(f) ≤ τ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then
Sρ(f) ≤ lim
n→∞
Sρ(Majn) + ε.
3.1.2. Biased Case. The assumption in The-
orem 3.6 that the votes are uniformly dis-
tributed in {−1, 1} can be relaxed, as we now describe. Let 0 < p < 1. Let X1, . . . , Xn be in-
dependent identically distributed random variables where P(X1 = 1) = 1−P(X1 = −1) = p.
Theorem 3.7 (Majority is Stablest, Formal, Biased Case, [MOO10, Theorem 4.4]).
Let 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Let −1 ≤ µ ≤ 1. Let t = tn ∈ R such that
∣∣EMajn,t(X)− µ∣∣ =
mint′∈R
∣∣EMajn,t − µ∣∣. Let τ > 0 and let f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} satisfy Ef(X) = µ and
Infi(f) ≤ τ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then
Sρ(f) ≤ lim
n→∞
Sρ(Majn,tn) +Op,1−ρ
( log log(1/τ)
log(1/τ)
)
.
1Picture taken from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Reflection in a soap bubble edit.jpg
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For an even more general version of Theorem 3.7, see [MOO10, Theorem 4.4]
Figure 3. Generalizing Theo-
rem 3.7 to elections with three
candidates is related to: prov-
ing that two joint soap bub-
bles take the pictured “double-
bubble” shape. Two soap bub-
bles enclose two separate and
fixed volumes of air, and they
minimize their total surface area
[HMRR02]. The plurality func-
tion should have an analogous op-
timality property. We will discuss
this connection more in Section 5.
3.2. More than Two Candidates. In
this section, we consider elections between
k ≥ 3 candidates, where each of n voters
casts a single vote for a single candidate.
Theorem 3.7 (and its generalizations
such as [MOO10, Theorem 4.4]) essentially
completely characterize majority functions
as the most stable to independently ran-
dom corruption of votes, when the election
has only two candidates. Unfortunately,
analogous statements for three or more
candidates seem harder to prove. With
more than two candidates, a suitable re-
placement for the majority is the plurality
function. In a plurality election, the can-
didate with the most votes wins the elec-
tion. It was conjectured [KKMO07, IM12]
that the plurality function is the balanced
voting method that is most stable to inde-
pendent, random vote corruption
Conjecture 3.8 (Plurality is Stablest,
Informal Version, [KKMO07], [IM12,
Conjecture 1.9]). Suppose we run an elec-
tion with a large number n of voters and
k ≥ 3 candidates. In this election, voters
are modelled to have the following random
behavior:
• Voters cast their votes randomly, independently, with equal probability of voting for
each candidate.
• Each voter has a small influence on the outcome of the election.
Then the plurality function is the balanced voting method that best preserves the outcome of
the election, when votes have been corrupted independently.
Figure 4. Three soap bub-
bles that have collided take the
shape shown here.
In the case that the probability of vote
corruption is small (ρ is close to 1), we
proved the first known case of Conjecture
3.8 in [Hei19], culminating a series of works
[CM12, MR15a, Hei17, MN18a, MN18b,
Hei18]. Conjecture 3.8 for all parameters
0 < ρ < 1 is still open. Unlike the case of
the Majority is Stablest (Theorem 3.7), Con-
jecture 3.8 cannot hold when the candidates
have unequal chances of winning the election
[HMN16]. This realization is an obstruction
13
to proving Theorem 3.8. It suggested that
proof methods for Theorem 3.7 cannot apply
to Conjecture 3.8. Indeed, calculus of varia-
tions methods have emerged as a promising
avenue for proving Conjecture 3.8.
Figure 5. Three soap bub-
bles that have collided take the
shape shown here2.
3.3. Additional Comments. Classic ref-
erences on noise stability and voting include
[KKL88, BKS99, Bou02, FKN02]. Discrete
Fourier analysis often plays a prominent role
in these works. The surveys [O’D, Kho] and
book [O’D14] describe the interconnected-
ness of these topics.
We have not focussed much on ranked
choice voting methods. For more on this
topic, see e.g. [MPR13, MR15b] or the comprehensive works [ASS02, ASS11, BCE+16].
Question 3.9. Is it possible to state a sensible version of the Plurality is Stablest Conjecture
3.8 for ranked choice voting methods?
Figure 6. The partition of Eu-
clidean space with three regions
of fixed Gaussian volume and
minimal total Gaussian surface
area takes this shape [MN18a,
MN18b, Hei19].
In ranked choice voting, each voter pro-
vides a ranked list of the candidates. Sup-
pose a voting method is then a function only
of the pairwise comparisons of each candi-
date, as in Table 2. Suppose then that each
of these pairwise comparisons is indepen-
dently corrupted. Then one possible answer
to Question 3.9 says that the Plurality of the
pairwise comparisons is most stable to this
kind of vote corruption. Taking the Plural-
ity of pairwise comparisons is known as the
Second Order Copeland voting method. So,
one could argue that this method is most
stable to vote corruption. However, under
other models of vote corruption, it is not
clear what the “best” ranked choice voting
method should be.
4. Brief Discussion of US Electoral College
The US Electoral College system is similar but not identical to the two-tier majority
function described in Example 1.5 with m = 51 equal-sized “states.” Suppose we run an
election between two candidates, where g is a two-tier majority function with m = 51, and if
f is the usual majority function with n a large odd number of voters. We already know from
Theorem 3.7 that the majority function is more stable to vote corruption that the electoral
college system. But how much more stable is it?
2Picture taken from https://www.flickr.com/photos/sm/2603411754/sizes/o/
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We consider the noise stability Sρ of each of these voting methods where ρ = 1− 2ε and
ε > 0 is small with 51 < 1/ε < n. That is, the probability of each vote being corrupted is
small. Then [Kal10, Theorem 3.4] [O’D08, p. 9]
S1−2ε(f) ≈ 1− 4
pi
√
ε, S1−2ε(g) ≈ 1− 2( 2
pi
)3/2
√
51
√
ε.
So, by Remark 3.5, the probability that vote corruption changes the election’s outcome is
about 5.7 times greater for the electoral college, than for majority. Here we used
2(2/pi)3/2
√
51
4/pi
≈ 5.698035 . . .
Computer simulation similarly shows that, when the size of each “state” defining the two-
tier majority function agrees with their size from the 2010 census, then the probability that
vote corruption changes the election’s outcome is about 5 times greater for the electoral
college, than for majority.
Strictly speaking, the US Electoral College system is not a two-tier majority function.
Each state (except for Maine and Nebraska) runs its own plurality vote, so that the candidate
winning the most votes in that state wins that particular state. Then each state’s winner
is entered into a nationwide weighted majority vote. If no candidate wins this weighted
majority vote, then the House of Representatives chooses the president, with one vote for
each of the 50 states.
The integer weight of each state in the nationwide majority vote is equal to the num-
ber of national congressional representatives in each state (with a weight of three given to
Washington D.C.) Consequently, each state has a minimum weight of 3 in the nationwide
majority vote (i.e. the electoral college vote). The apportionment of members to the House
of Representatives is a nontrivial task, since the ratios of state populations should somehow
closely match the ratios of their numbers of electoral votes. Apportionment methods were
hotly debated over the nation’s history; for more on this history see e.g. [BY75].
5. Other Applications
As mentioned above, Majority is Stablest and Plurality is Stablest are closely related
to geometric optimization problems involving soap bubbles. For a general introduction to
minimal surfaces, see the surveys [CI19, CM11a] or the book [CM11b]. For more discussion
on the connections between voting and geometry, see the surveys [O’D, Kho] and the research
papers [KKMO07, IM12].
In 2002, it was proven that the two regions of fixed volume that minimize their total surface
area are those pictured in Figure 3 [HMRR02]. The analogous result for three regions, as in
Figure 4, is still open. This problem is only solved in the plane [Wic04]. Surprisingly, the
Gaussian versions of these problem were recently resolved in [MN18b], and then strengthened
in [Hei19].
The initial motivation for the Majority is Stablest Theorem 3.7 and the Plurality is Sta-
blest Conjecture 3.8 came from theoretical computer science. These inequalities imply sharp
computational hardness for MAX-CUT and its generalizations. That is, we can efficiently,
approximately solve some computational problem, and improving on this approximation is
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impossible to do efficiently, assuming the Unique Games Conjecture, a standard complex-
ity theoretic assumption. For more on the relation between voting and computer science
applications, see [Kho, KKMO07, IM12].
The noise stability of functions has developed into a subject of its own. Various references
exist on the subject, such as [DHK+10].
Voting is often used as a subroutine in various machine learning algorithms, such as
“boosting” algorithms [Sch90, FS97]. Supposing one has access to several “weak” experts
that can with 51% certainty predict some event. If we then take the majority vote among
many of these people, then their combined opinion can achieve close to 100% certainty for a
prediction. This idea of combining expert opinions to “boost” the probability of correctness
is used in the algorithms of [Sch90, FS97].
Lastly, we should mention the recent proof of the Sensitivity Conjecture [Hua19], which is
somewhat related to voting theory. The methods and result there seem interesting to explore
further.
Acknowledgement. Thanks to Daniel Kane and Elchanan Mossel for helpful discussions.
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